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FEATURED SCHOLARSHIP

Looking Outside the Image: Trusting a “Few Bad Apples” in Errol
Morris’s Standard Operating Procedure (2008)
Brenda Helmbrecht
“Pictures were taken. You have to see them.”
-- Sabrina Harman in a letter to her wife Kelly
“Photographs can be responsible for incredible misperceptions.”
– Errol Morris, in an interview with Joshua Oppenheimer, 2012
Throughout his career, documentarian Errol Morris has questioned the truth-telling
nature of photographs. In his New York Times “Opinionator” blog, his book Believing
is Seeing: Observations on the Mysteries of Photography (2011), and in his
documentaries, Morris argues that images don’t inherently lend themselves to a clarity
of understanding and vision. This recognition achieves a particular urgency and
poignancy in Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), Morris’s 2008 documentary about
the 2004 Abu Ghraib Prison controversy. Interrogating the scandalous images of
dehumanization and torture, Morris’s film demonstrates that images—especially when
severed from their historical settings—create truths and realities that may not
necessarily illuminate the events being portrayed.
The audience of SOP comes to the film with a perspective that has already been
shaped by reductionist representations of the well-known photographs. For instance,
in May 2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz famously lamented, “it’s
such a disservice to everyone else, that a few bad apples can create some large
problems for everybody.”1 If prisoners were tortured, the story went, some
undisciplined soldiers were to blame. Consequently, by the time SOP was released in
theatres, both the courts and the public had already deemed guilty most of the U.S.
soldiers—Wolfowitz’s “bad apples”—featured in Morris’s film. As Frank Möller notes,
for many media outlets (and, I would add, the federal government), “the photographs
were the problem, not the acts of torture.”2 In response, Morris spends the entirety of
SOP asking his audience to question the veracity of the government’s “bad apple”
theory. His trademark directorial style—namely, tightly framed interviews and stylized
reenactments—seeks to engender trust with his audience as his film methodically
revises the tidy war narrative the media and the government quietly constructed.
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In this paper, I position Morris’s Standard Operating Procedure within the larger
American response to images of the Iraq War. In addition to grounding my argument
within journalistic accounts, I work with Linda Williams’s observations regarding
Morris’s use of “the forcible frame” and Susan Sontag’s work with war images.
Further, Frank Möller’s and J.M. Bernstein’s theories on the link between images
depicting pain and viewer reception will assist me in looking outward. As Möller
argues, images of people in pain denote “power relations” between those watching and
those being watched.3 My essay asks, what happens when the world looks at images
of people being humiliated and tortured for a war that pretends to fight for freedom and
liberation?
In many of his documentaries—The Thin Blue Line (1988), Fog of War (2003), Tabloid
(2010)— Morris investigates the persuasive “I see=I believe” and “I see=I experience”
formulas that can define viewers’ relationships with images and the events they depict.
Morris argues, “we think that having seen a part of the whole, that we’re seeing
everything.”4 In studying the role of memory in Morris’s films, Devin Orgeron and
Marsha Orgeron show how Morris investigates an image’s capacity to “create the
illusion of ‘having witnessed.’”5 However, if one’s understanding of a factual event is
solely imagistic and, in turn, illusory, then the moment represented—a moment pulled
from its context—begins to detach from reality; at best, the viewer witnesses a
simulacrum. Morris maintains that, we, as spectators in a visual culture, “imagine that
photographs provide a magic path to the truth,”6 in part, I think, because images allow
for quick, at-a-glance encounters with complex events. Images generate meaning by
feeding off the ideologies and experiences of their viewers. In other words, images
rely on us, as viewers, to bring meaning to them; however, we often expect images to
bring meaning to us.
So it’s hard to be told that images simply don’t have a direct line to “truth” or even to
facts. Yet this is the message Morris has spent his entire career delivering and it is the
message that many visual consumers may not want to confront. In SOP, Morris must
convince his viewers that though they have seen the Abu Ghraib photos and drawn
conclusions about what transpired in the prison, the “real story of Abu Ghraib is in no
way contained in those images.”7 He forces his viewers to look more deliberately at
the photos—to study, for instance, what’s been cropped out, both in terms of the
factual content of individual shots and the realities soldiers experienced when taking
the photos.
The Bush Administration’s “Shock and Awe Campaign”—which sought to swiftly
devastate Saddam’s government—became the primary frame for the war effort. Most
Americans, still devastated by the 9/11 attacks, supported the war. According to the
Pew Research Center, in March 2003, 72% of Americans surveyed believed using
military force in Iraq was the “right decision.”8 The initial public support was, in part,
bolstered by the heroic images sent home by hundreds of embedded journalists
reporting from the front lines under the protection of the military. However, as Andrew
Lindner shows in his content analysis of 742 news articles written by 156 journalists,
embedded stories were terribly unbalanced.9 When compared to independent
journalists and journalists stationed in Baghdad, embedded journalists (who traveled
and lived with the troops) were more likely to report on soldiers’ deaths and military
movements, as well as to use soldiers for information sources. But they were less
likely to use Iraqi civilians as sources, or to report on bombings and the resulting
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destruction. Moreover, embedded stories seldom covered civilian casualties; only 11%
of the articles Lindner analyzed focused on or even mentioned Iraqi deaths.10 The
influence of the limited embedded viewpoint is hard to deny, especially since
embedded reporters’ stories dominated media coverage: “Of the 742 articles within the
sample, 63.3 percent were written by journalists embedded with troops…not only did
embedded reporting represent a majority of the total available press, it dominated
public attention. Because embedded reporting was both more affordable to news
agencies and more heavily hyped for its novelty, this vantage point dramatically
overshadowed the others.”11 In effect, it was simply difficult to find news stories that
offered more balanced depictions of the war.
In discussing his experiences as an embedded journalist, David Ignatius concedes that
“embedding comes at a price. We are observing these wars from just one perspective,
not seeing them whole.”12 Indeed, the government and military needed the media’s
help to broadcast highly orchestrated PR moves to ensure the country developed
positive feelings about the war effort (Bush’s premature “Mission Accomplished”
banner being but one example13). Additionally, carefully selected embedded journalists
were offered battlefield tours after fighting ceased and casualties were removed from
sight.14 It’s not surprising, then, that the public had been unaccustomed to seeing
candid images of war when the Abu Ghraib torture pictures came to light in 2004, so
the outcry was both intense and, in many ways, uninformed.
In effect, the media and the government deliberately framed the war to garner public
support, and, Morris contends, they framed the “bad apples” by blaming them for the
mess at Abu Ghraib. As Lindner argues, both the government and the military knew
that “after regular exposure to the frame, media consumers come to adopt the framed
storyline as their dominant way of thinking about an issue.”15 SOP shows that while the
Abu Ghraib photos exposed the world to the war’s darker reality, the government spun
the “bad apple” narrative to safeguard the systemic policies permitting torture. In his
article, “The Effects of the Pictures,” Alphonso Lingis focuses on how little effect the
photos truly had: “No pictures have been propagated more insistently by the media
than the pictures of Abu Ghraib; every American saw them…But for the American
public, they in the end provoked no question affecting national policy.”16 Lingis
explains that the heavy media coverage devoted to the photos only convinced viewers
of their own moral standing against those “few perverts” who took the pictures;
moreover, many Americans believed that prisoners held at Abu Ghraib were, as Vice
President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld insisted, malicious men who had
done something terrible.17
As SOP demonstrates, I see does not equal I experience when we look at the Abu
Ghraib photos because the prison images cannot stand in for the whole. Upon being
released to the public, the Abu Ghraib images lost their indexical qualities because
they no longer possessed a firm relationship with the actual narrative of torture and
abuse that took place in the prison. In response, Morris’s film re-directs viewers’
attention to what’s missing from the photos. To be more specific, a photograph of a
soldier standing next to an Iraqi prisoner in distress can invite the viewer to infer that
the soldier was responsible for that prisoner’s physical state, an inference which may
or may not be true. As Linda Williams writes in her essay, “Cluster Fuck: The Forcible
Frame in Errol Morris’s Standard Operating Procedure,” “On first seeing these pictures,
few people thought they needed further explanations of a frame of reference.”18 The
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images foreground the poorly disciplined “bad apples,” yet missing from the photos are
people who legitimized the events at the prison—people like John Yoo, who, as
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, wrote the now-infamous “Torture Memos” that
created a legal path for enhanced interrogation techniques.19
As noted by Jeffrey Chown, the Iraq War is “the first ‘digital war,’” turning soldiers into
amateur documentarians.20 Soldiers replaced the traditional wartime letters that
documented so many previous wars with photographs that show, as Susan Sontag
has observed, “their war, their fun, their observations of what they find picturesque,
their atrocities.”21 They collected images to prove their “thereness” in the war. Indeed,
the Abu Ghraib photos’ lack of professionalism—their poor framing, lack of focus, and
bad lighting—gave them an even greater authenticity. In effect, the grittier the photos,
the more amateurish and spontaneous they felt, the more easily the images could
seduce viewers into confusing the image with reality. Sontag concludes that
“something becomes real…by being photographed.”22 SOP seeks to determine how
the reality of war was created in Abu Ghraib and whether that reality was actually more
of a fantasy.
Sanitizing Images: The Visual Context Surrounding Iraq
Shortly after the United States bombed Baghdad in March 2003, the Bush
Administration began enforcing a policy preventing the dissemination of images of
dead soldiers arriving on military bases. In a Washington Post article, Dana Milbank
provided some context for this mandate, “since the end of the Vietnam War, presidents
have worried that their military actions would lose support once the public glimpsed the
remains of U.S. soldiers arriving at air bases in flag-draped caskets.”23 Certainly, the
government’s anxiety about war images can be traced to the belief that showing these
images runs the risk of American voters identifying the abstract concept of war with the
very real understanding of American casualties. “The understanding of war among
people who have not experienced war,” Sontag observed, “is now chiefly a product of”
war footage shown in the media.24 By controlling which images are shown, the
government can also influence how Americans experience the war as well as whether
they continue to support it.
The federal government’s policy was challenged when Russ Kick, a 34-year-old writer
who, as Kick himself declared, devoted his time to “digging up things actively
suppressed or ignored,” filed a Freedom of Information Act request on November 6,
2003.25 He petitioned to receive, “All photographs showing caskets (or other devices)
containing the remains of US military personnel at Dover AFB. This would include, but
not be limited to, caskets arriving, caskets departing, and any funerary rites/rituals
being performed” at the Dover Air Force Base, the military’s largest mortuary.26 After
his initial request was denied, he successfully appealed the decision and the Air Force
sent him a CD-ROM containing 361 photographs taken by Department of Defense
photographers. He subsequently posted the images on his website,
TheMemoryHole.org, which featured the tagline, “Rescuing Knowledge, Freeing
Information.”27 In the days after Kick posted the images, he received nine million hits
to his website.
Soon after images depicting American soldiers’ coffins graced newspapers and news
shows across the country, the program “Nightline” devoted an entire episode to
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reading the names and displaying photographs of the 721 soldiers who had died in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Ted Koppel, the program’s news anchor, said his decision to
produce the show was inspired by an issue of Life Magazine that printed the pictures
of soldiers who had died in Vietnam during the course of one week. While Koppel saw
the show as a way to honor fallen soldiers, other media conglomerates, like the
Sinclair Broadcast Group (a known Bush supporter) saw the program as “motivated by
a political agenda designed to undermine the efforts of the United States in Iraq.”28 As
reported in The New York Times, Sinclair “one of the country's largest owners of local
television stations, pre-empted the broadcast from its eight ABC-affiliated stations,
saying the program amounted to an antiwar statement.”29 Instead, Sinclair chose to
have its stations run an episode of the sitcom, “Dharma and Greg,” which, at the time,
outraged Senator John McCain.30
The “Nightline” program was very minimalist in terms of production values; the entire
forty minutes was devoted to Koppel methodically reading the names of the dead as
their photos were shown “two at a time, just enough to register a name, an age, and
shock at how young—and how old—some were.”31 When “Nightline” could not obtain
a portrait, the program instead showed a Department of Defense photograph of a flagdraped coffin that Kick legally obtained. The critical response to the “Nightline”
program as well as the government’s refusal to show images of soldiers’ coffins both
point to an anxiety regarding the emotional response that war images can invoke. No
one really knows how to respond to images of suffering and pain. Ultimately, viewers
may, as Möller argues, experience “the inadequacy of [their] own response,” especially
if they don’t know how to end the suffering they see.32 Images of war casualties can
particularize war and compel viewers to translate the abstract idea of death into
something sensory and concrete.
In the introduction to their edited collection, Ethics and Images of Pain, Asbjørn
Grøstad and Henrik Gustafsson ask what happens when we see images of people
suffering: Do we look away? Do we engage? Do we try to speak for the victims? Do
we intervene? The authors argue that “the sum of the individual responses [to images
of human suffering]—each of which may very well be inadequate in that it neither
directly nor immediately contributes to alleviate the suffering depicted—ultimately
forms an adequate response of individuals acting together with members of the
discursively constituted political public, thus exerting power.”33 When the Abu Ghraib
images were covered by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker in May 2004,34 the
government worked to frame the discussion and to ensure an inadequate response
from the public. For instance, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld refused to use the
word “torture” to describe the photographs, and instead searched for euphemisms
(“abuse,” “humiliation”) during press conferences.35 As recounted by Robert Hariman
and John Luis Lucaites in No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture,
and Liberal Democracy, much of the violence depicted in the images had already been
covered by print media (working from Red Cross reports, for instance), yet “most
citizens apparently were not doing their reading, and many still believed the
government had clean hands.”36
Since the beginning of the Iraq War, filmmakers have worked to capture compelling
war images that contribute to a larger historical narrative. Films like Gunner Palace
(2004), Occupation: Dreamland (2005), and Restrepo (2010) attempt to bring home
the realities of war. Yet the construction of images—such as the consequences of
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framing a shot, what’s outside the frame, whom a filmmaker chooses to interview—are
seldom subject to deeper and more critical investigations by the filmmakers; war
images themselves aren’t the subjects of the films. Rather, the films lean on a cinema
verité, “cameras-on-the-ground” visual style, and offer what are framed as truthful and
factual depictions of war. They rely on the “I see=I experience” style of meaningmaking for the viewers. When SOP (tagline: “The war on terror will be photographed”)
was released in 2008, the public and the media had already reached settled
conclusions about the notorious soldiers featured in those images. Some of them had
gone to prison, most had been dishonorably discharged, and no one with real power
(no one from the CIA or the upper-levels of the Bush Administration) had been held
responsible. Case closed.
Yet, nothing about those images was truly settled. Despite the initial public outcry,
Morris argued that no one really “clarified the relationship between the photos and
what happened” in the Abu Ghraib prison.37 Morris sought to better understand the
political and institutional context surrounding the Abu Ghraib images. Were the photos
taken by a group of rogue soldiers who lacked self-control? Or did the photos
document systemic abuse that had been tacitly approved and even encouraged by
those in power? Morris clearly believes the latter. Imbedded within the images of
abuse and torture, he detects an inappropriate degree of attention directed towards “a
very small group of people who were responsible for little or nothing, and directed
away from people who were far more complicit in what happened in that prison.”38
Williams argues that Morris’s film “seeks to understand the epistemological frame of
crimes of war”39 by investigating the literal frame of the images. By doing so, Morris
can begin to question what happened outside of them. As SOP illustrates, digital
cameras enabled soldiers to distance themselves from the surreal madness
enveloping the prison. As Williams writes, these soldiers, “who sought a vantage point
that would dissociate them from the prisoners with whom they lived,” looked at their
immediate surroundings on a digital screen and could finally cope.40 They could
interact with the images as a sort of historical document (albeit one occurring in realtime) and locate themselves outside the acts of torture and abuse they witnessed and
sometimes participated in—acts for which they would eventually be held responsible.
The photos not only depicted criminal acts; rather, they were, Williams continues, a
“legitimate expression of the frustration of [the soldiers’] own impotency, their own
inability to act successfully as soldiers, their pathetic imitation of ‘norms’ that utterly
failed to tell them their duty.”41 The soldiers merely captured their experiences, not
unlike anyone else who finds themselves in unbelievable and fantastic circumstances.
As the soldiers themselves explain in SOP, capturing and distributing images became
a distraction from the chaos surrounding them.
In turn, SOP uses these same images and accompanying witness testimony to help
viewers (re)engage with the Iraq War. The film encourages viewers to establish a
closer proximity to the torturous acts by questioning their previous knowledge and
beliefs about the Iraq War and about Abu Ghraib. Morris’s directorial style, as I
discuss below, asks viewers to confront the torturers with empathy. I want to extend
Williams’s argument that explores how “images of death and torture are literally and
metaphorically framed by the people who take them….and by the publics who see
them.”42 In effect, I argue that SOP asks audiences to push against the war’s
institutionally supported frame. The film wants audiences to look outside its
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boundaries, to consider not just who took the Abu Ghraib photographs, but to
understand the realities that the photos both reflect and hide. These photos depict a
certain truth, one that reveals a glimpse into not only the day-to-day lives of a handful
of soldiers at the prison, but also into the military’s interrogation policies. As Military
Police Specialist Megan Ambuhl Graner explains at the end of the film, soldiers have
to follow orders: if you don’t, “you’re gonna get into trouble, and if you do, obviously
you end up in trouble.”43 What can we, as viewers of the Abu Ghraib photos and,
subsequently, as viewers of SOP, claim to know about Abu Ghraib? About the Iraq
War? About our own role as spectators?
Looking Outside the Image
SOP begins with an image of playing cards. We see the Ace of Hearts and the Ace of
Clubs featuring Uday and Qusay Hussein’s faces falling in slow motion before
dramatically crashing onto a wooden table. Former Brigadier General Janice Karpinski
begins to explain in voiceover that Saddam’s two sons had just been killed. This
opening scene—which is reminiscent of a re-enactment, but doesn’t quite fit that
category—positions the film as being stylistically and tonally deliberate. By beginning
his film with two playing cards taken from a deck that essentially served as the
military’s “Most Wanted” list, Morris instantly conveys the game-like nature of the war
and of the Abu Ghraib prison. In effect, the military was already in the business of
trading images so perhaps it’s not such a stretch to understand why soldiers would
follow suit.
The film was released long after punishments for the Abu Ghraib events were doled
out. Thus, both the viewers and the film’s subjects are acutely aware that SOP is
constructed of testimony being delivered by people whom, as Williams notes, “many of
[the viewers] already believe to be war criminals.”44 Thus, the soldiers’ job, and, in
turn, Morris’s, becomes that of persuasion: they need to coax viewers into believing
that the Abu Ghraib images they have seen are not to be taken at face value, and that
military personnel who served prison time for offenses such as aggravated assault,
dereliction of duty, and mistreatment of prisoners, are, in fact, believable. While Morris
may be asking a lot of his viewers, I contend that audiences accept this challenge
because SOP encourages them to parse through details and testimony as though they
were putting the subjects on trial. For instance, in discussing a photo of Lynndie
England holding a dog leash attached to a prisoner, Megan Ambuhl Graner explains,
“They were trying to say she was dragging him, which never occurred. I was there and
I know it didn’t happen.”45 The “they” in Ambuhl Graner’s statement is somewhat
unclear. Is she referring to the army and the courts? Is she referring to the media? Or
is she referring to the viewers themselves, people who have already drawn
conclusions about the image?
While Morris’s film ostensibly focuses on Abu Ghraib and the Iraq war, it also presents
viewers with more candid, lighter images, some of which may elicit uneasy laughter
from viewers. Scenes showing soldiers goofing around and playing pranks on one
another bring a human quality to the film. In effect, Morris asks viewers to see his
subjects as people, contrasting their portrayal in the media as criminals. Yet, the film
also asks viewers to reconsider the link between seeing and believing at a time when
Army Specialist Charles Graner was still serving a ten-year prison sentence for his
crimes.46 Indeed, his absence in SOP is felt. We see images of him, we hear his wife,
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Megan Ambuhl Graner, as well as his ex-lover, Lynndie England, speak about him—
but we never hear from him. In many ways, his absence allows the film to position him
as a villain of sorts because it’s much tougher to empathize with a subject who is never
on camera.
Perhaps because he handles images with such suspicion and caution, Morris seems to
lend credence to the letters that Sabrina Harman wrote to her wife, Kelly, while
stationed at Abu Ghraib. Early in the film, Harman’s voiceover reads the letters as
they appear on the screen in extreme close-up.47 The camera often circles around the
letters in a slow overheard arc shot or gradually tracks across them, movement that
can feel somewhat dizzying and disorienting, in part because the viewer doesn’t know
who is speaking or why these letters are significant. Morris also plays with the lighting
in these shots: the letters appear to be backlit, which gives them a yellowish-sepia
tone; they are heavy with deep shadows. Indeed, the lighting techniques seem
reminiscent of the “masking” used in early black and white films. Sometimes, as
Harman is reading, the entire letter slowly becomes ensconced in darkness and
another letter slowly fades into the frame. The lighting brings a dramatic and even
candid quality to these letters. They seem aged—like historical documents that would
be found deep in a library’s archive, and, as such, are somehow credible. These
heavily stylized scenes are far-removed from the cinema verité approach found in
more conventional war documentaries.
While Morris maintains the Ken Burns-esque approach to soldiers quaintly reading
letters written to loved ones, he departs from this tone quickly; he asks us not to feel
nostalgia for the soldier on the front-lines, but to question the dark circumstances
under which Harman’s letters were written. In other words, Harman is not relating
tales of heroic conquests or complaining about how much she misses her wife. She is
reporting abject abuse and horror. The close-up shots of the letters are often intercut
with re-enactments of the narrative that Harman retells. Morris’s filmic approach gives
their testimony a gravity that would not be achieved with a simple interview. Harman’s
calm, even-toned voiceover shapes how we react when she makes eye contact with us
in an interview a few minutes later to tell us about the environment surrounding the
photos she took.
As has been well-documented, Morris conducts interviews with his own invention, the
“Interrotron,” a two-way video teleconferencer that compels his films’ subjects to look
directly into the camera while speaking. In some moments, viewers may feel like they
are having a one-on-one conversation with the subjects, while in other moments, they
may feel like jurists sorting through evidence. Notably, viewers don’t actually see
Harman interviewed on the Interrotron until five minutes after encountering her letters.
This narrative arrangement, it seems, asks viewers to withhold their judgment of
Harman (who became notorious for giving the camera a “thumbs up” while posing over
a dead Iraqi) until we better understand her viewpoint.
However, SOP doesn’t always sustain eye contact between the viewer and the
subjects. For instance, during one thirty-six second interview with Military Police
Sergeant Jamal Davis early in the film, Morris cuts into—but not away from—the
interview four times.48 After each cut, Davis reappears in a slightly different location in
the frame. These very quick cuts almost equate to a “blink” that enables the viewer to
refresh her vision before moving further into the testimony. On the other hand, there
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are also scenes where the eye contact can be almost too intense. For instance,
Karpinski seems to stare down the Interrotron. Her unrelenting eye contact, combined
with her resolute and angry demeanor, are almost too much to take in; it’s hard not to
break her gaze. While it’s clear that she is furious with her superiors, she almost
seems to take her frustration out on the film’s viewers, as though they were the ones
who didn’t treat her with the respect and decorum she thinks she’s earned.
During at least two points in the film, Morris uses the Interrotron to display Abu Ghraib
images to his interviewees. First, he shows Lynndie England an image of her holding
a dog leash attached to a prisoner’s neck.49 Here, England’s eye contact leaves the
viewer for a moment while both she and the film’s viewers study the image’s details
together, including the fact that Ambuhl Graner, who was cropped out of the image by
some news outlets, is standing on the edge of the photo. Morris also shows an image
to Roman Krohl, a Military Intelligence Interrogator, and asks him to identify the
individuals in the photograph.50 After studying the image for thirty seconds, Krohl’s eye
contact switches from the photos back to the film’s spectators. In these two moments,
viewers are reminded that they are collaborating with the film’s subjects to interpret
these images. Slowly, over the course of the entire film, the viewer establishes an
uneasy trust with the Abu Ghraib soldiers whereas, at the beginning of the film, the
relationship could best be described as unreceptive or distant.
However, SOP does not let its subjects off the hook for the role they played in abusing
prisoners. Morris’s re-enactments of the abuse are often brutal and difficult to watch.
For instance, Ken Davis, a Military Police Sergeant, describes an interrogation he
witnessed where soldiers forced a prisoner to undress “and then they [made] him low
crawl, [made] him try to drag his genitals onto the concrete.”51 Morris depicts this
scene using a nude actor, whose face is often out of focus, crawling slowly and in
slow-motion along a wet, concrete floor; a male soldier stands behind him, out of
focus, holding a baton. Exaggerated sounds of the prison environment combined with
the sound of the prisoner’s belabored breathing echo throughout the scene (and the
theater).
In a later scene, both Tim Dugan, a Civilian Interrogator, and Harman describe the
mistreatment of an Iraqi general who had been brought to the prison.52 The
interrogators shaved the man’s eyebrows, an act Morris reenacts in extreme close up.
Viewers watch a plastic razor being roughly pulled across the bushy eyebrow of what
appears to be an elderly man (Harman describes him as being “like a grandfather, very
respectful” 53). The eyebrow and the razor fill the entire frame. This scene
communicates the role of humiliation in interrogation unlike any other in the film. Reenactments of the iconic “man on the box” are also filmed using a combination of
extreme close-up shots, slow motion, and dramatic lighting and shadows. We see the
man’s dirty fingers being wrapped with wires and his calloused feet trying to balance
on the narrow MRE boxes (he had falsely been told he would be electrocuted if he fell).
Morris intercuts images of the man with close-ups of a digital camera taking photos.
Harman explains that the “wires were taken off after photos were taken” at which point
Morris cuts away from the re-enactment to the soldiers’ own images.54
Perhaps because Morris pioneered the use of re-enactments and dramatizations in
documentaries with his film The Thin Blue Line, he has been questioned for overly
relying on the techniques to convey “truth.” In using reenactments, Morris intentionally
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violates the purist documentarian stance which favors minimal directorial intervention,
but in doing so, his films paradoxically feel more honest because he draws attention to
and questions the filmic apparatus—and the genre—itself. Morris’s reenactments
question, challenge, or even verify his subjects’ viewpoints. As Orgeron and Orgeron
have noted, Morris’s visual style – including his direct “authorial intrusion”—“leads to a
documentary that foregrounds multiplicity and does not avow its ties to the fictional
world.”55 Morris has argued that “posing”—by way of moving or removing objects
within a scene, or adjusting the lighting, coloring, or sound—has been and always will
be part of photography and film, and that posing “is not necessarily deception.
Deception is deception.”56 The reenactments require critical viewer engagement and,
just like the Abu Ghraib photos themselves, should not be regarded as detached truthtellers. Rather, they ask viewers to make meaning not just of what they can see within
a shot, but to also interpret what’s missing.
By sorting through reenactments, interrotronned interviews, and the film’s overall visual
elements, viewers can begin to understand the true complexity of interpreting
images—even Morris’s. The actors in Morris’s reenactments never speak and their
faces are always out of focus. They are frequently shot in close-up (and at times,
extreme close-up), which seems to force viewers to encounter the event being
depicted more so than the people participating in that event. The actor serves to
illustrate—to enact—the testimony being delivered by the films’ subjects.
Unlike SOP’s reenactments, the CIA, Navy Seals, and Other Governmental Agencies
(OGAs) at Abu Ghraib sought to deceive. As Ken Davis recounts, when someone of
importance visited the prison, military personnel would put on “a dog and pony show”57
and the reality of Abu Ghraib would momentarily shift as prisoners got their clothes and
mattresses returned to them. Further, when Manadel al-Jamadi died during a CIA
interrogation at Abu Ghraib, the CIA put an I.V. in the dead man’s arm so they could
get him out of the prison without starting a riot. The only person convicted of any crime
related to his death was Harman, who photographed the dead man’s body and posed
with it. This unwise choice comes to represent even further deception because
anyone who saw the photo of Harman and al-Jamadi out of context likely assumed that
she killed him, yet Morris shows us “the photograph misdirects us.”58 In mistaking
Harman for the killer, the real killers went undetected.
The climax of SOP arrives when Brent Pack, a Special Agent with the Army’s Criminal
Investigation Division, determines if the Abu Ghraib photos depicted criminal acts. As
Pack discusses the criteria for a criminal act—physical injury, sexual humiliation or
abuse, failing to stop prisoners from harming themselves, etc.—Morris stamps the
words “Criminal Act” or “S.O.P,” backed by the sound of gunfire, on top of the
photograph. This scene comes ninety minutes into the film, after the viewers have
confronted difficult images that they likely concluded would be classified as torture,
including the image of the man on the box that Pack labeled “S.O.P.” He explains that
he has been in the army for twenty years, including spending four months at
Guantanamo Bay, and that “people who haven’t been where I’ve been, I can’t expect
them to see the pictures in the same way.”59 Yet, as a viewer, it’s impossible not to be
outraged with Pack’s classifications. If Morris wants us to trust the beliefs we form as
a result of what we see, then we have to question the information conveyed throughout
his film, too. Images direct attention to certain elements of an experience or event, but
they also misdirect and, in some instances, can deceive uncritical viewers.
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In looking at these images of torture, we are ultimately forced to question our own role
in the war effort. Do we look at the images and feel complicit in their violence, do we
feel obligated to take action, or do we look away and continue on with our lives? In his
“Preface” to the collection, Ethics and Images of Pain, J.M. Bernstein argues that it is
nearly impossible to think of an image of someone in pain where the “correct response
is to not look.”60 Images should compel us to act, to make new meanings and new
interpretations of situations we thought we understood. Bernstein continues, “the
question can never be solely: how has this image failed? Always there is a further
better question: how have we failed this image? What must I/we do to live up to its
claims and demands?”61
I think Morris’s film speak to these same questions. Do we trust Pack when he deems
a torturous act committed during a war our government is fighting on our behalf as
simply Standard Operating Procedure and then move on? Or do we recalibrate? Do
we come up with an understanding of the image that compels us to tell our government
that we don’t think war and torture must be paired in order for the war effort to be
successful (however “success” is defined)? As Morris writes, the Abu Ghraib images
do not tell the whole story: “The photographs are the start of a trail of evidence, but not
the end.”62 As has been documented by multiple journalists and scholars, and as the
U.S. government’s own “Torture Memos” later revealed, the abusive treatment
prisoners suffered at the hands of American soldiers was sanctioned by leaders at the
highest levels, while those who received jail sentences were at the lowest, most
vulnerable, military levels. The photos depicted these low-ranking enlisted men and
women, thereby making it harder to deny their innocence, unless we look outside the
image for the more complex, textured, and accurate meanings.
Morris’s approach to filming bygone and generally settled historical events requires his
viewers to question their previous understandings of those moments. SOP ultimately
maintains that the events viewers think they see depicted by an image may not
actually be part of that instant in time at all. The memories created by the image may
be false. Morris’s films subsist in a liminal space where truth and lies are always
already constructs and every image is simultaneously true and false. And it is this
gray area that compels Morris to encourage viewers to keep returning to facts, to what
has been proven about a given moment in time. Only from this vantage point we can
begin digging around the margins of the facts to shine some light on the unknowns.
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